

Measuring the Deterioration of Trust on the Dark Web: Evidence from Operation Bayonet

February 17, 2021

How can we measure trust on illicit darknet market websites? Borrowing from the industrial organization literature, I propose a new empirical strategy that uses vendors' return on reputation as a proxy for trust. I use this strategy to quantify the deterioration of trust on the Dream darknet market in response to Operation Bayonet, a law enforcement operation. I tease apart the effects of the operation's first stage, a conventional market takedown, and its second stage, an impersonation campaign. I find that the latter significantly erodes marketplace trust while the former does not. This decrease in trust manifests as an increase in vendors' returns on reputation. I estimate Operation Bayonet to have increased the difference in mean revenue between a 5-star and a 4-star vendor by 32.5 percentage points. I further find that deterioration in buyer trust concentrates darknet sales in the hands of fewer vendors, raising the barriers to entry and increasing the effectiveness of future anti-vendor law enforcement operations.

Keywords: darknet markets, trust, reputation, Operation Bayonet

JEL codes: L14, L15, K42, K24

1 Introduction

Since 2009, the number of drug abusers worldwide has risen more than 30% to 271 million – more than thrice as fast as the global population growth rate (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019). A major contributing factor to this extreme growth that is often overlooked is the rise of online drug trafficking. This trafficking takes place on “darknet markets” – hidden websites where buyers and vendors can transact anonymously.

The share of global drug transactions that take place on darknet markets is relatively small, but growing fast. The total estimated revenue of the darknet ecosystem has grown from \$180 million USD in 2013 to \$790 million in 2019 (Chainalysis, 2020). Darknet markets offer drug vendors a “low risk, high traffic, high mark-up” venue to sell their products (Van Hout & Bingham, 2014). Consequently, consumers can buy drugs more safely and conveniently than on the streets (Barratt et al., 2016). But what the consumer finds desirable, society may not. For instance, fentanyl – a synthetic opioid that is easily overdosed – is 90% cheaper on the dark web than “street” heroin, its closest substitute (Miller, 2020). Fentanyl is at the heart of the recent American opioid crisis that ended 47,000 lives in 2017 alone (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018).

In response to this criminal innovation, law enforcement agencies have had to adapt. In 2013, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Ross Ulbricht and took down Silk Road, the darknet market he managed (United States Attorney’s Office, 2015). In 2014, an international consortium of law enforcement agencies took down nine darknet markets simultaneously and arrested 17 administrators (Decary-Hetu & Giommoni, 2016). These operations, however, did not *deter* so much as *displace* buyers and vendors, who simply migrated to one of the many alternative darknet markets (Decary-Hetu & Giommoni, 2016; Van Buskirk et al., 2014).

In July 2017, a coordinated effort between the FBI and the Dutch National Police saw the shutdown of two darknet markets within 16 days of each other. On July 4th, the FBI took down Alphabay, the largest market at the time. 16 days later, the Dutch police took down Hansa, the second largest. A strongly-worded report by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) questioned the operation’s effectiveness, noting that the “revenues and trade volumes [of the ecosystem as a whole]...do not appear to have been affected” (Christin & Thomas, 2019).

Revenue and trade volume, however, are not the only metrics by which these operations can be judged. Because everyone is anonymous on darknet markets, *trust* between buyers and vendors is necessary for transactions to occur. An

operation that fails to reduce revenue and trade volume, but manages to erode this trust, can still be considered “successful.”

This double takedown, called Operation Bayonet, was the first such operation. By the time the FBI had taken down Alphabay, Hansa was already under the control of the Dutch police. For a month, they had impersonated the Hansa administrators and interacted directly with the buyers and vendors on the website. When the Dutch authorities took down Hansa, they also publicly announced the details of their impersonation, along with its fruits: unencrypted passwords, IP addresses, and more than 10,000 real-life mailing addresses.

The intention of Operation Bayonet, then, was not just to dismantle most popular websites, but to make users of other still operational markets “believe that sellers...have already been compromised and are feeding information [to law enforcement agencies]” (Popper, 2019). In other words, it sought to damage buyers’ trust in vendors.

In this paper, I take a page from the industrial organization literature and propose *vendors’ returns on reputation* as a novel, more meaningful proxy for darknet buyers’ trust. The mechanism is simple: when trust decreases, buyers would rather transact with reputable vendors, increasing returns on reputation as a result.

As the first quantitative study of trust on darknet markets, this paper lies at the intersection of economics and law enforcement. I propose a new empirical strategy to quantify the deterioration of trust on the dark web arising from law enforcement operations. By exploiting the two-stage nature of Operation Bayonet, I find that impersonation campaigns significantly erode marketplace trust and increase vendors’ returns on reputation, whereas conventional takedowns have no such effect. On Dream, the largest surviving darknet market, I estimate that Operation Bayonet increased the difference between a 5-star vendor’s mean revenue and a 4-star vendor’s by 32.5 percentage points, and grew the market share of reputable vendors by 41.2%. Higher returns on reputation favor established vendors and discourage prospective ones, which explains why Dream’s vendor population stopped growing after Operation Bayonet. All together, these findings suggest that deterioration in buyer trust concentrates sales in the hands of fewer vendors, thus increasing the effectiveness of future anti-vendor law enforcement operations.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on reputation and darknet markets that precede this paper, and outlines my hypotheses in the context of Operation Bayonet. Section 3 describes my data and empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses my findings and demonstrates their robustness. Section 5 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 Darknet Markets

Darknet markets are part of the “dark web,” which refers to the set of websites that can neither be accessed using conventional web browsers (e.g., Chrome, Safari) nor found using conventional search engines (e.g., Google, Bing). Dark websites are only accessible via the Tor browser, a special software that masks the Internet Protocol addresses of its users, disguising their identities. While drugs comprise a majority of the products sold on darknet markets, other products (weapons, stolen credit cards, stolen identities, etc.) are also available (Christin, 2013).

The process of buying from a darknet market is broadly similar to buying from “clearnet markets” like eBay or Amazon. Buyers choose an item from different vendors’ product listings, pay online, and wait for it to arrive in the mail. But there are three distinct differences in how transactions occur.

First, all sales take place in cryptocurrency. Usual online payment methods (PayPal, credit cards) are linked to real-world identities. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin or Monero can be stored in and disbursed from anonymous digital wallets.

Second, buyers almost never pay vendors at the time of purchase. If they did, vendors could scam them by delivering a lower-quality product, or no product at all. Obviously, darknet buyers cannot turn to consumer protection agencies for legal recourse. Instead, buyers transmit the money to the website administrator for safekeeping (escrow). The amount is only disbursed to the vendor if the buyer reports having received the product in good condition. Otherwise, the administrator helps the buyer and vendor resolve their dispute.¹

Third, buyers are required to leave reviews for the vendor. A review consists of a numeric star rating (e.g., 1-star to 5-stars) and a text comment.² Because of the lengths darknet markets go to in order to preserve anonymity, vendor feedback matters much more on darknet markets, because feedback is the clearest signal of vendors’ trustworthiness. This is a crucial point that warrants elaboration.

On marketplaces that are either legal or online, participants can build trust by disclosing some aspect of their identities. For example, on a legal and virtual market like eBay, vendors’ real names are hidden from the buyer but known to the administrator. Conversely, on an illegal, offline market such as a crack house, buyers and vendors meet face-to-face and can identify each other’s appearances,

¹Clearly, this is an imperfect system that allows buyers to scam vendors, and administrators to scam both parties. Some newer darknet markets use “multiple-signature” escrow technology, which requires two of the three parties to sign off any disbursement of funds.

²On markets that do not strictly require this, social norms strongly compel the buyer to do so.

if not their real names (May & Bhardwa, 2016). Darknet markets are unique in that they are both illegal and online.

A quick thought experiment: imagine you are a buyer on the Dream darknet market, deciding whether to buy cocaine from @MickeyMouse. It doesn't matter to you that @MickeyMouse's profile says "I am not a scammer," because they might be lying. Neither does it matter that on a different darknet market, there is a user @M1ckeyMous3 with a perfect 5 star rating, because they might not be the same person. All you really know is that on Dream, @MickeyMouse has an average rating of 3.5 stars and only 10 previous transactions. Would you buy from @MickeyMouse? Likely not.

This vignette illustrates how a history of buyer feedback, aggregated and displayed for all future buyers to see, is the primary signal of a vendor's reputation. Without an ability to distinguish between vendors, risk-averse buyers will not transact.

2.2 Literature Review

Returns on Reputation. In this paper, I follow Bar-Isaac & Deb's definition of reputation as "a probability distribution interpreted... as the likelihood that [an] agent is of one type rather than another" (2014, p.44). On virtual marketplaces, reputation distinguishes honest vendors from scammers, and rewards the former with returns of some sort. On a computer processor auction on eBay, Houser & Wooders (2006) find that the price of the winning bid increases with the vendor's positive reviews. Positive returns on reputation have also been found in the auctions of rare coins (Melnik & Alm, 2002) and comic books (Dewally & Ederington, 2006).

Such consistent returns on reputation have been harder to pin down in non-auction online markets. Saastamoinen (2009) and Cai, Jin, Liu, & Zhou (2014) find slightly negative returns on reputation with regard to price. However, Ye, Xu, Kiang, Wu, & Sun (2013) argue that returns on reputation may not always manifest as price premiums but rather as volume premiums, as they find on Taobao.³ Furthermore, returns on reputation may not be the same across vendors. For instance, Fan, Ju, & Xiao (2016) show that on Taobao, an increase to an established vendor's rating raises his revenue – but an increase to a newcomer's rating motivates him to cut prices to boost his ratings further.

As collecting suitable data was difficult before online marketplaces, the empirical literature on reputation effects is still young (Tadelis, 2016). But the literature on reputation in darknet markets is even younger. Hardy & Norgaard

³A Chinese version of eBay.

(2016) study Silk Road, the most successful darknet market in the early 2010s, and find a positive effect of vendor feedback rating on product price per unit. They construct a model where equilibrium prices are determined by buyers and vendors constantly trying to scam each other, and attempt to use it to estimate vendors' discount factors. While their model nicely accounts for vendor scamming behavior, it relies excessively on an accurate parameterization of the *buyer's* reputation, which is unobservable both to the econometrician and the real-life darknet vendor.

More recently, Espinosa (2019) finds heterogeneous but positive returns on reputation across vendors of different drug types. He studies Hansa, the third largest darknet market in 2017, before it was taken over by the Dutch police in Operation Bayonet. He also finds that reputable vendors on average command higher prices per unit.

Espinosa estimates that after law enforcement takes down a darknet market, surviving markets enjoy a short-term decrease in likelihood of vendor scams, as newly migrated vendors attempt to build up a reputation from scratch.

All in all, previous studies on reputation effects have primarily been interested in whether or not such an effect exists, and if so, what its magnitude might be.⁴ This paper is the first to consider how returns on reputation might *change* in response to exogenous events, and how this variable might be useful from a law-enforcement perspective.

Evaluating Law Enforcement Operations. As illicit drugs are the most popular product on darknet markets, evaluating the impact of takedown operations usually falls to drug/addiction policy analysts. They base their evaluations on metrics well-known to economists – the demand, supply, and prices of illicit drugs. To summarize a decade's worth of findings: after takedowns, sales volumes fall in the short term but continue to rise in the long term (Christin & Thomas, 2019; Kruithof et al., 2016; Soska & Christin, 2015), consistent with the well-known inelasticity of addictive drugs; the majority of sellers are displaced to other markets rather than deterred (Decary-Hetu & Giommoni, 2016; Van Buskirk et al., 2014); consequently, drug prices online neither rise nor fall significantly (Decary-Hetu & Giommoni, 2016; Miller, 2020).

I believe new metrics are needed to evaluate Operation Bayonet, which represents a shift in law enforcement agencies' strategy from taking down darknet administrators, which has been likened to a game of whack-a-mole (Greenberg,

⁴One noteworthy event study is by Cai, Jin, Liu, & Zhou (2014), who find that the introduction of a centralized feedback system to Eachnet, a Chinese peer-to-peer marketplace, widens the market share differential between reputable and disreputable vendors. No event studies about reputation have been done on darknet markets.

2018), to eroding the very trust that underpins these markets. I proceed to describe the details of the operation in the next section.

2.3 Operation Bayonet

In 2017, the three largest darknet markets were Alphabay, with 40,000 vendors; Hansa, with 3,600 vendors; and Dream, with 2,000 vendors (Greenberg, 2018). That year, a coalition of law enforcement agencies, led by the American Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Dutch National Police, executed Operation Bayonet, which took down Alphabay and Hansa in quick succession (Department of Justice, 2017).




Figure 1: Timeline of events for Operation Bayonet.

The sequence of events is outlined in Figure 1. On July 4, 2017, the FBI took down Alphabay. In response, vendors and buyers moved to Dream, Hansa, and other markets. Unbeknownst to them, Hansa’s administrators had already been arrested. The Dutch police had been running the website since June, collecting passwords, IP addresses, and more than 10,000 mailing addresses (Satter & Bajak, 2017). Sixteen days later, on July 20, the Dutch Police took down Hansa and publicly released details about Operation Bayonet. In the aftermath, Dream rose to prominence as the largest surviving darknet market, capturing more than 85% of total dark web sales (Christin & Thomas, 2019). Hence this paper focuses on the effect of Operation Bayonet on Dream.

The two stages of the operation had very different effects on buyers’ trust in vendors. The first takedown (of Alphabay) was identical to previous ones: authorities shut down the website, waited a few days, then posted a notice of seizure in its place (Figure 2) worded similarly to previous notices (Appendix, Figures 8 and 9). The dark web community knew that previous takedowns had been targeted attacks that resulted in the arrest of market *administrators*, not vendors or buyers.⁵ Hence, we can expect the Alphabay takedown not to have

⁵This is not to say that vendors were never caught. Indeed, between 2011 and 2015, at least 167 vendors were arrested (Branwen, 2019). However, all of these arrests were due to “operational security” lapses, such as leaving fingerprints on packages (Caleb, 2019). None were connected to market takedowns.




Figure 2: Notice of seizure of Alphabay darknet market. Transcription of text in Appendix. *Image from Wikipedia.*

significantly decreased buyers’ trust in vendors on Dream.

In contrast, the second stage of Bayonet was an unanticipated and unprecedented shock to the dark web community. The Hansa seizure notice (Figure 3) contained two unique pieces of information. First, it said that law enforcement agencies had collected account information that could identify and compromise certain users. For instance, vendors might use the same password on their accounts on other websites, giving access to potentially identifying information.⁶ By not specifying *which* vendors might be compromised, the seizure notice was especially effective in instilling a generalized rather than a specific mistrust.

Second, it said that law enforcement agencies had been impersonating Hansa administrators for a month without anyone knowing. This would have led buyers to suspect not only other market administrators, but also existing vendors of other markets. Indeed, after the second takedown, discussion threads such as “LE [law enforcement] compromised vendors” cropped up on online forums. One such comment on this thread by @pinkfluiddude says, “Please assist me establish if a vendor has been compromised. . . Are there any indicators that I must be on the lookout for?” (Tumblr, 2017). This shows circumstantial evidence that the Hansa takedown succeeded in its goal of casting doubt on vendors’ trustworthiness.

⁶This is exactly how law enforcement later infiltrated 16 Dream vendors’ accounts (Var-mazis, 2017).

Hence, we can expect the Hansa takedown to have significantly decreased buyers' trust.




Figure 3: Notice of seizure of Hansa darknet market. Transcription of text in Appendix. *Image from Quartz.com.*

2.4 Hypothesized Mechanism

My hypothesized mechanism relating buyers' trust to vendors' returns on reputation is straightforward. Consider a stylized darknet market with two types of vendors, reputable and disreputable. Reputable vendors have high star ratings, are perceived by buyers to be lower risk (e.g., less likely to be scammers, more likely to package products properly), and can command higher prices. Disreputable vendors have low star ratings, are perceived as higher risk, and must offer lower prices.

Buyers on this market are either risk-averse or risk-loving. Risk-averse buyers prefer to buy at premium prices from reputable vendors, while risk-loving buyers

prefer to pay the disreputable vendors' lower prices. In short, a vendor's star rating (i.e., reputation) is the information buyers use to trade off between price and risk.

When buyers' trust in vendors decreases – for instance, from an impersonation campaign – the perceived risk of buying from all vendors increases. Consequently, all buyers reevaluate their tradeoffs, and some risk-loving buyers switch to reputable vendors. In other words, buyers concentrate their transactions among fewer, more trusted vendors. As a result, the difference in sale volumes between reputable and disreputable vendors increases, whether prices change or not. Hence, every marginal increase in a vendor's feedback rating is associated with higher increases in revenue than before.

This hypothesized mechanism generates four testable predictions to check whether this buyer-switching mechanism is true:

- H1:** First, law enforcement operations that do not decrease buyers' trust in vendors would not increase vendors' returns on reputation.
- H2:** Second, operations that *do* decrease buyers' trust in vendors would increase vendors' returns on reputation.
- H3:** Third, such an operation (as in H2) would increase the market share of reputable vendors while decreasing that of disreputable vendors.

H1 and H2 test for a causal link between an impersonation campaign (call this event A) and an increase in vendors' returns on reputation (event B). If H1 is true, then without A , B does not occur. If H2 is true, then if A occurs, B occurs. If both are true, then A is sufficient for B .

H3 tests the way by which impersonation affects returns on reputation. By examining vendor market shares, I can check whether my proposed mechanism, buyer-switching behavior, actually occurs. I empirically test H1 to H3 by comparing how the two stages of Operation Bayonet – a conventional takedown and an impersonation campaign – might have affected Dream market differently.

However, it is plausible that the second stage of Operation Bayonet decreased buyer trust *not* because it was an impersonation campaign, but simply because it happened so soon after the first stage. In order to pinpoint impersonation as the key factor of Operation Bayonet, I conduct a placebo test:

- H4:** An impersonation campaign would have no effect on a market where participants' identities were known. On that market, vendors' returns on reputation would remain unchanged.

To empirically test H4, I briefly examine Operation Bayonet’s effect on the Valhalla market. Unlike most darknet markets (including Dream, Alphabay, and Hansa) which are open for anyone to join, Valhalla is unique in that it is *closed-door*. What that means is new buyers and vendors can only join Valhalla by the invitation of a current member. I find it reasonable to think that such a market would be more resistant to impersonation campaigns than Dream. If the second stage of Bayonet had no effect on Valhalla vendors’ returns on reputation, that would be strong evidence that impersonation was truly the key element of Operation Bayonet.

3 Empirical Strategy

3.1 Dream Market Data

I obtain data on the Dream market from cybersecurity researchers Nicolas Christin and Jeremy Thomas (Carnegie Mellon University, 2019) via the Impact Cybertrust dataset repository. Using automated web crawlers, the researchers collected transaction-level data from Dream covering parts of 2017 and 2018. More precisely, the researchers collect vendor reviews, which is what all darknet market studies use as proxy for transactions. The correspondence between reviews and transactions is one-to-one: buyers are required to leave feedback, and only buyers are allowed to leave feedback. Each review comprises a star rating (an integer from 1 to 5), the sale amount, and the date of review. Each review is further associated with a unique product ID and unique vendor ID.




Figure 4: Dream market user interface. *Image from Dreammarket.link.*

I aggregate this review data to the vendor level for two reasons. First, a vendor’s rating is the same across all his products: there is no such thing as a

product-specific rating. On the Dream user interface (Figure 4), the 4.85 star rating on “4 GR PURE Afghan #3 Heroin” clearly refers to the vendor, @dutchglory, not the product itself. Second, the version of the data obtained from Christin and Thomas had the titles of product listings redacted for privacy reasons.⁷ As seen in Figure 4, the quantity of each product listing is written into its title. Hence, I do not observe quantity in my data, and cannot run item-level regressions using price per unit as Hardy & Norgaard (2016) and Espinosa (2019) have done. Instead, I focus on returns on reputation that accrue to vendors’ revenue.

For this paper, I restrict my attention to the 48-day block between June 18 and August 4, 2017, divided into three time periods, as shown in Figure 5. Time period t_1 captures the state of Dream market up until Operation Bayonet. Time period t_2 captures the effect of a conventional takedown, while t_3 captures the combined effect of both takedowns. I restrict the lengths of t_1 and t_3 to be the same length as t_2 , which is 16 days. Aggregating the data into three time periods not only smooths out random fluctuations unrelated to the takedown events of interest, but also allows me to interact time dummies with other variables.




Figure 5: Discrete time periods used in analysis. The Alphabay takedown on July 4 begins t_2 . The Hansa takedown on July 20 begins t_3 .

This paper faces the same limitations as the studies previously mentioned. First, as review data only capture orders placed via Dream’s centralized system, I cannot observe sales where the buyer found the seller on Dream, but privately arranged the purchase. Since such sales technically happened “outside” Dream market, I exclude them from my analysis.

Second, verifying the completeness of webscraped data is very difficult, and doubly so given the security measures of darknet markets. Consequently, some reviews might have gone unscraped and unrecorded. However, this measurement error is distributed randomly across vendors and time periods, and is reduced using computational methods more fully described in Soska and Christin (2015).

⁷Similarly, vendor usernames were replaced with unique alphanumeric codes.

3.2 Estimating Transaction Date

The Dream data contains the date a review was posted, but not the date the transaction was initiated. I use some heuristics to backdate different kinds of items appropriately, using other observable item characteristics.

Every product is classified into one of ten categories: eight different families of drugs; digital goods; or miscellaneous products. I assume that digital goods ship immediately, and hence backdate their reviews by 1 day.

Every product listing also specifies what country(ies) it ships to and from. Because packages shipped internationally tend to be more stringently checked for illicit goods than packages shipped domestically (Decary-Hetu et al., 2016), I assume buyers ship domestically whenever possible. Due to the ease of shipping illicit goods within Europe (Christin & Thomas, 2019), I consider intra-Europe shipments to be domestic.⁸

From browsing darknet buyers' discussion boards on both the clearnet (e.g., Reddit.com, 2019a) and the dark web (e.g., Dread.onion, 2018, 2019), I estimate the average shipping time as 1 week for domestic orders and 2 weeks for international orders. Additionally, Dream automatically releases escrow funds to the vendor after 14 days unless the buyer extends the time period (Reddit.com, 2019c). Hence, I backdate nondigital items that ship domestically by 7 days, and all other items by 14 days.

Because international shipping times vary more greatly and are more prone to delays, I rerun my analyses in Section 4 with internationally-shipped items backdated by 16, 18, or 20 days. I find my results hold with significance at 16 and 18 days, and remain qualitatively similar at 20 days (Appendix, Tables 9 through 11).

3.3 Regression Model

At this point, I have an imbalanced panel ($n = 4,723$) of 2,122 vendors observed across three time periods. Using this data, I can estimate the fixed effects model

$$y_{it} = \gamma_1 a_t + \gamma_2 h_t + \gamma_3 r_{it} + \delta_1 a_t \cdot r_{it} + \delta_2 h_t \cdot r_{it} + \beta' X_{it} + \alpha_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

indexed by vendor $i = 1 \dots 2,122$ and time period $t = 1, 2, 3$, where:

- y_{it} is some measure of the revenue of vendor i in time period t ;

⁸Aside from Europe, other countries with domestically shipped items include: America, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, and Thailand.

- a_t is a dummy equal to 1 if $t = 2$ or 3 , and equal to 0 otherwise, such that γ_1 captures the change in vendor revenue due to the Alphabay takedown;
- h_t is a dummy equal to 1 if $t = 3$ and equal to 0 otherwise, such that γ_2 captures the further change in vendor revenue from t_2 to t_3 due to the Hansa takedown;
- r_{it} is some measure of the reputation of vendor i in time period t . Its coefficient, γ_3 , therefore captures vendor returns on reputation;
- $a_t \cdot r_{it}$ and $h_t \cdot r_{it}$ are interaction terms that allow vendor returns on reputation to differ in each time period. Because my time periods are demarcated by takedown events, δ_1 can be interpreted as the effect of the Alphabay takedown on these returns, and δ_2 the additional effect of the Hansa takedown;
- X_{it} is a vector of three time-variant, vendor-specific controls: period transaction count, historical transaction count, and product diversity;
- α_i is a vendor fixed effect, and ϵ_{it} is an error term for unobservables clustered at the vendor level.

I include vendor fixed effects to capture time-invariant vendor characteristics, e.g., a vendor’s historical stock of reputation before t_1 , or whether a vendor practices stealth shipping.⁹ Even then, errors are still likely serially correlated by vendor. As I have sufficiently many clusters (i.e., vendors) relative to time periods, I proceed to cluster errors at the vendor level.

The time dummies a_t and h_t are constructed such that they can be interpreted as incremental effects, i.e., returns on reputation are captured by γ_3 in t_1 , $\gamma_3 + \delta_1$ in t_2 , and $\gamma_3 + \delta_1 + \delta_2$ in t_3 . I am primarily interested in δ_1 and δ_2 . If my hypothesized buyer-switching mechanism is true, then by H1 we expect δ_1 to be insignificant or nonpositive, and by H2 we expect δ_2 to be significant and positive.

3.4 Constructing Variables

I now describe briefly some considerations and design choices I made while aggregating review data into vendor-level variables.

Outcome variable. Revenue y_{it} is computed as the sum of vendor i ’s sales in time t , denominated in USD. Although transactions are conducted in cryptocurrency, vendors can and do peg the prices of their listings to a dollar value to

⁹Shipping drugs in concealed packages such that they seem innocuous on first glance, e.g., hiding weed inside a DVD case, sandwiching a strip of LSD to the inside of a coupon book (Aldridge & Askew, 2017).

reduce exchange rate risk (Christin, 2013). I construct two measures of revenue: mean revenue per transaction (*meanrevenue*) and market share (*mktshare*).

Regressor of interest. Vendor’s reputation r_{it} is usually specified as the aggregate of a lifetime of reviews: Hardy and Norgaard (2016) use lifetime mean star rating, and Espinosa (2019) uses total positive reviews. However, these studies ignore the stylized fact that more recent reviews are more salient to buyers (for instance, Reddit.com, 2019b). Simply put, a 4-star vendor with a recent spate of 5-star reviews appears more reputable to buyers than a 4-star vendor with a recent spate of 1-star reviews. Indeed, darknet markets show a vendor’s detailed review history to buyers in reverse chronological order, as in Figure 6 below. Hence, I construct three measures of reputation: *meanrating*, the mean star rating of a vendor’s transactions in a given time period t ; *fivestars*, the number of 5-star reviews a vendor garnered in t ; and for robustness, *meanuntil*, the mean star rating of a vendor’s transactions up until t .




Figure 6: Reviews on darknet markets are presented in reverse chronological order. Image from Reddit.com.

Controls. X_{it} is a vector of time-variant controls. It always includes *txns*, the number of transactions a vendor made in a given time period, which likely affects

both market share and mean revenue per transaction. X_{it} optionally includes $txnsuntil$, the number of transactions a vendor had made up until the start of time t ; and $diversity$, a Herfindahl-Hirschman index given by

$$1 - \sum_{j=1}^J p_j^2$$

where p_j is the proportion of transactions in time t that belong to product category j of J . By this index, a vendor selling products of only one category has $diversity = 0$, and $diversity$ approaches 1 as the vendor’s product catalog increases in variety.

	t_1		t_2		t_3		Description
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
meanrevenue	678.10	1,491.39	874.45	2042.97	711.69	1,439.63	mean revenue per transaction, USD
mktshare	0.082	0.506	0.056	0.398	0.057	0.292	vendor’s share of period sales, %
meanrating	4.87	0.38	4.86	0.35	4.85	0.33	period mean star rating
fivestars	30.86	49.29	44.05	79.11	49.95	78.97	number of 5-star reviews
meanuntil	4.76	0.74	4.57	1.18	4.79	0.60	lifetime mean star rating
txns	39.96	65.96	59.01	97.71	48.55	77.52	number of period transactions
txnsuntil	159.82	247.91	140.35	269.93	186.81	346.74	number of past transactions
diversity	0.312	0.288	0.308	0.290	0.285	0.289	HHI index, 1 is most diverse
new vendors	32		277		77		vendors with zero transactions before t
total vendors	1,219		1,772		1,736		vendors who made a sale in t

Table 1: Summary statistics of Dream vendor-level variables, by time period.

Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1 above. In particular, observe how the “usual” law-enforcement metrics – *meanrevenue* and *txns* – increase on average from t_1 to t_2 , consistent with the fact that vendors and buyers displaced by the Alphabay shutdown migrate to Dream and continue their business. However, both *meanrevenue* and *txns* significantly decrease from t_2 to t_3 ($p < 0.05$),¹⁰ despite the closure of Hansa that would have displaced even more vendors and buyers. This suggests that the Hansa takedown exerted some deterrence effect that the Alphabay takedown did not, at least in the short term. Previous studies that did not tease apart these two takedowns would have overlooked this simple but meaningful insight.

¹⁰Using two-sample, one-sided t -tests. t -statistic for *meanrevenue* computed as $(711.69 - 874.45)/\sqrt{2042.97^2/1772 + 1439.63^2/1736} = -2.73$, and similarly for *txns*.

4 Findings and Discussion

4.1 Testing Hypotheses 1 to 3

Using Dream data, I run the fixed effect model given by Equation (1) and report the estimated coefficients in Table 2 on the next page. Column 1 presents the baseline model of $\log \text{meanrevenue}$ regressed on meanrating . Column 2 includes the full set of controls. Columns 3 and 4 replace meanrating with fivestars . Columns 5 through 8 replace the outcome variable with $\log \text{mktshare}$. Using a cluster-robust Hausman test that allows for serial correlation, all eight specifications reject the null hypothesis that regressors are exogenous ($p < 0.01$). I thus report only fixed effect estimates throughout this paper.

Recall that by H1, we expect δ_1 , the interaction of the Alphasay time dummy and vendor reputation, to be insignificant or nonpositive. Our empirical results are indeed as expected: the coefficients on $\text{Alphasay} \times \text{meanrating}$ are insignificant. Meanwhile, the coefficients on $\text{Alphasay} \times \text{fivestars}$ are significantly negative across specifications. Regarding the latter, we must be careful with our interpretation. Columns 4 and 8, for instance, seem to suggest that after the first takedown, gaining a 5-star review would not only decrease a vendor's mean revenue by 2.8%, but also shrink his market share by 7.8%. Given what we know about darknet markets, negative returns on reputation seem implausible.

What the negative coefficients are more likely capturing is the effect of vendors displaced from Alphasay migrating to Dream. Another way to interpret returns on reputation is as the difference in revenue between reputable and disreputable vendors. From Table 1, we see that 15.63%¹¹ of vendors in t_2 were new to Dream, compared to only 2.63% of vendors in t_1 and 4.44% in t_3 . Because these new vendors had just begun building up reputation, and yet were generating a good amount of sales, returns on reputation decreased. This has nothing to do with buyers' trust in vendors, so H1 still holds.

Now recall that by H2, we expect δ_2 , the interaction of the Hansa time dummy and vendor reputation, to be significant and positive. This is exactly what we find: the coefficients on $\text{Hansa} \times \text{meanrating}$ and $\text{Hansa} \times \text{fivestars}$ are consistently positive and significant across all specifications ($p < 0.01$). For instance, Column 2 suggests that after the second takedown, the difference between a 5-star and 4-star vendor's mean revenue increases by 32.5 percentage points. The signs and magnitudes of Hansa interaction terms are similar whether controls are included or not, suggesting that these estimates of δ_2 are robust. Coefficients remain positive when meanuntil is used instead of meanrating , although they decrease

¹¹Computed as $277/1,772$.

Table 2: Fixed effect estimates. 14-day lag in international shipments. Coefficients of interest in **bold**.

	Log meanrevenue			Log mktshare				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
meanrating	-0.00581 (-0.06)	-0.0143 (-0.17)			0.0457 (0.30)	0.0197 (0.16)		
Alphabay $\times$ meanrating	-0.112 (-1.01)	-0.0885 (-0.88)			-0.207 (-1.14)	-0.142 (-0.95)		
Hansa $\times$ meanrating	0.377*** (3.32)	0.325** (2.80)			0.687*** (3.92)	0.565** (3.28)		
fivestars			0.00108 (1.05)	0.000176 (0.18)			0.00523* (2.49)	0.00207 (1.05)
Alphabay $\times$ fivestars			-0.00384*** (-5.43)	-0.00280* (-2.52)			-0.0115*** (-7.23)	-0.00780*** (-3.40)
Hansa $\times$ fivestars			0.00255*** (8.61)	0.00266*** (3.38)			0.00637*** (9.41)	0.00746*** (4.61)
Alphabay	0.675 (1.24)	0.552 (1.13)	0.247*** (7.35)	0.219*** (6.62)	0.302 (0.34)	-0.000903 (-0.01)	-0.359*** (-6.42)	-0.425*** (-7.91)
Hansa	-1.877*** (-3.40)	-1.592** (-2.82)	-0.141*** (-4.63)	-0.107*** (-3.64)	-3.003*** (-3.52)	-2.299** (-2.74)	0.0956 (1.83)	0.176*** (3.64)
Transaction count	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.161	0.211	0.186	0.231	0.244	0.341	0.309	0.393
Observations	4723	4723	4723	4723	4723	4723	4723	4723

t statistics in parentheses. Additional controls are *transuntil* and *diversity*. Lag in international shipments is 14 days.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

in magnitude and significance (Appendix, Table 8). These findings provide strong evidence in support of H2.

Recall that we do not observe transaction date in the data, only date of review. As mentioned in Section 3.2, these results might be an artifact of the choices I made in backdating transactions. Thus, I rerun these regressions with international shipments lagged by 16, 18, and 20 days. Table 3 on the next page reports the coefficients of interest obtained from running regressions with different lags (with full results in Appendix, Tables 9 to 11). We find the coefficients have the same signs and similar magnitudes. They suggest that the results we find in support of H1 and H2 are robust to changes in lag in international shipments.

	Lag in international shipments (days)			
	14	16	18	20
Alphabay $\times$ meanrating	-0.0885 (-0.88)	-0.0510 (-0.50)	-0.0691 (-0.65)	-0.0516 (-0.48)
Alphabay $\times$ fivestars	-0.00280* (-2.52)	-0.00279* (-2.51)	-0.00291** (-2.68)	-0.00322** (-3.01)
Hansa $\times$ meanrating	0.325* (2.80)	0.296* (2.29)	0.254* (2.17)	0.130 (1.05)
Hansa $\times$ fivestars	0.00266*** (3.38)	0.00234** (3.06)	0.00146 (1.61)	0.00151 (1.81)
Observations	4,723	4,699	4,686	4,665
<i>t</i> statistics in parentheses. All controls included.				

Table 3: Coefficients of interest across different lag specifications. Outcome variable is log revenue per transaction.

Recall that by H3, we expect reputable vendors' market share to increase from t_2 to t_3 . To check H3, I compute the market shares¹² of reputable vendors in each time period. I consider two alternate definitions of *reputable*: "above the median *meanrating*" and "has a *meanrating* of 5.0." Table 4 on the next page reports the results of both.

We see that across lag specifications, reputable vendors' market share consistently falls from t_1 to t_2 , then rises in t_3 . The initial fall is likely due to vendors displaced by the Alphabay takedown bringing their buyers with them. The subsequent rise is consistent with H3, and can be explained by our hypothesized

¹²Computed as the total revenue of reputable vendors divided by all vendors' revenue.

Lag	“Reputable” criterion	Market share (%)		
		t_1	t_2	t_3
14	Above median	31.12	10.68	15.08
	5 stars	31.12	10.68	9.34
16	Above median	30.47	10.78	15.20
	5 stars	30.47	10.78	9.38
18	Above median	30.81	10.93	14.43
	5 stars	30.81	10.93	8.95
20	Above median	30.34	10.92	14.46
	5 stars	30.34	10.92	8.99

Table 4: Market shares of reputable vendors per time period, under two criteria for “reputable,” with various lags in international shipments.

mechanism: after trust in vendors decreases, some buyers switch over to more reputable vendors.

Interestingly, we observe that within each lag specification, both the above-median criterion and 5-star criterion yield almost identical measures of market share. This close correspondence suggests that about half of all vendors had current 5-star mean ratings. However, after the Hansa takedown, the market share of 5-star vendors drops below the above-median market share, implying that less than half of all vendors were 5-star in t_3 . One possible explanation is that because of decreased trust, buyers review vendors more critically, so fewer vendors retain a flat 5-star mean rating. With the non-anonymized version of the dataset, I hope to test this claim by applying sentiment analysis on the text comments attached to buyer reviews. For now, I shall speculate no further.

As an aside: some families of illegal drugs are more severely policed than others. In America, for instance, trafficking up to 50 kilograms of marijuana mixture carries a jail sentence of not *more* than 5 years, while trafficking any amount of fentanyl or heroin carries a sentence of not *less* than 5 years (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2017). Did the Hansa takedown affect vendors of more punishable drug families differently? I run a fixed effects model given by

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{it} = & \gamma_1 a_t + \gamma_2 h_t + \gamma_3 r_{it} + \delta_1 a_t \cdot r_{it} + \delta_2 h_t \cdot r_{it} \\
& + severe_i (\gamma_1 a_t + \gamma_2 h_t + \gamma_3 r_{it} + \delta_1 a_t \cdot r_{it} + \delta_2 h_t \cdot r_{it}) \\
& + \beta' X_{it} + \alpha_i + \epsilon_i,
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $severe_i$ is a dummy equal to 1 if vendor i primarily deals in the most severely penalized drug families (opiates and ecstasy) and equal to 0 otherwise. All other variables remain as previously defined. Such a specification allows the

two takedowns to affect returns on reputation differently depending on the “severity” of a vendor’s primary product. I estimate Equation (2) using *meanrating* for vendor reputation, and report the coefficients on its interaction terms in Table 5 below.

	<i>meanrevenue</i>	<i>mktshare</i>
Alphabay $\times$ <i>meanrating</i>	-0.0917 (-0.79)	-0.133 (-0.75)
Hansa $\times$ <i>meanrating</i>	0.340** (2.63)	0.577** (2.96)
severe $\times$ <i>meanrating</i>	-0.135 (-0.71)	-0.0193 (-0.07)
severe $\times$ Alphabay $\times$ <i>meanrating</i>	0.0640 (0.29)	-0.00383 (-0.01)
severe $\times$ Hansa $\times$ <i>meanrating</i>	-0.206 (-0.66)	-0.136 (-0.30)
Adjusted R^2	0.211	0.341

t statistics in parentheses. All controls included. 14-day lag in international shipments.

** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Interaction terms of reputation (*meanrating*) with *severe*.

We see that none of the *severe* interaction terms are statistically different from zero. Consequently, the adjusted R^2 s are virtually identical to those in Table 2, Columns 2 and 6, which run the same regressions without the additional *severe* terms. However, adding them does not diminish the significance of the Hansa $\times$ *meanrating* coefficients. This suggests that the Hansa takedown similarly decreased buyers’ trust in all vendors, regardless of the actual legal penalties they might suffer. We find similar results when *fivestars* is the measure of vendor reputation (Appendix, Table 12).

4.2 Testing Hypothesis 4

At this point we have found evidence for H1 to H3, which jointly suggest that the Hansa takedown decreased buyers’ trust and increased vendors’ returns on reputation whereas the Alphabay takedown did not. Clearly, the two takedowns had different – indeed, opposite – effects on the Dream market. Just from the Dream data, however, we cannot *technically* attribute the success of the Hansa takedown to the impersonation tactics it used. For example, one could argue that the Hansa

takedown decreased buyer trust because it happened so soon after Alphabay, or because it was led by the Dutch police instead of the FBI. Although our qualitative and anecdotal knowledge about Operation Bayonet (Section 2.3) make us fairly convinced that the impersonation tactic is the key difference between the two stages, we would like to show this using data.

Ideally, I would have data on a “placebo” darknet market identical to Dream in every aspect, but immune to impersonation campaigns. As with Dream, I would estimate Equation (1) and examine the interaction terms. If the $\text{Hansa} \times \text{meanrating}$ and $\text{Hansa} \times \text{fivestars}$ terms are still significantly positive, then clearly impersonation is not the driver of returns on reputation.

Fortunately, the dataset from Carnegie Mellon University also contained review data on Valhalla, a closed-door darknet market that buyers and vendors can only join by invitation. In contrast to Dream, which anyone with the Tor browser can join, registering on Valhalla (whether as buyer or vendor) requires a “referral link” from an existing market participant (Dreammarket.link, 2018b). Theoretically, the true identity of each participant on Valhalla would be known by at least one other participant.

While Valhalla is by no means immune to law enforcement impersonation and infiltration, its invitation-only mechanism makes it at least appear much more resistant. Although much smaller than Dream,¹³ the same kinds of products sold on Dream are also sold on Valhalla in similar market shares, as shown in Table 6. All in all, I find it reasonable to use Valhalla to test H4.

Product Category	Market share (%)	
	Dream	Valhalla
Cannabis	26.41	30.85
Opioids	8.58	7.77
Ecstasy	9.16	7.17
Stimulants	20.85	14.40
Other Drugs	19.12	26.32
Digital Goods	9.17	4.68
Misc Products	6.71	8.81

Table 6: Sales by product category as percentage of total sales in Dream and Valhalla markets.

¹³Dream was the largest market that survived Operation Bayonet by far: after Alphabay and Hansa were shut, Dream accounted for 85% of all dark web transactions, while the remaining 15% was split among fourteen other marketplaces, Valhalla among them (Christin & Thomas, 2019).

I proceed to aggregate Valhalla review data to the vendor level the same way I did for Dream. I end up with an imbalanced panel ($n = 314$) of 162 vendors observed across t_1 to t_3 . As seen in Figure 7, Valhalla operates on a thumbs-up/thumbs-down feedback system only. I thus use *thumbsup*, the number of positive reviews a vendor garnered in time t , as proxy for vendor reputation. All other outcome, time, and control variables are constructed exactly the same way as in Section 3.4. Summary statistics for Valhalla data are relegated to the Appendix, Table 13.

	METH (ICE) 2 GR D-VARIANT	113 EUR	DUTCHRABBIT2 (2365 / -5)
	SPEED PASTE (amphetamine) 100 gr	220 EUR	DUTCHRABBIT2 (2365 / -5)
	150x GOLDEN ACE OF SPADES -100+mg MDMA & 65+mg MDA	270 EUR	DutchMasters (1803)

Figure 7: Hansa feedback system is thumbs-up/thumbs-down only. *Image from Darkweblink.com.*

I estimate Equation (1) using Valhalla data and report the coefficients in Table 7 on the next page. Column 1 presents the baseline model of log *meanrevenue* per transaction regressed on *thumbsup*. Column 2 includes the full set of controls. Columns 3 and 4 replace the outcome variable with log *mktshare*.

Looking at Table 7, we find no significance on any of the interaction terms. We also observe that the signs of these terms are inconsistent across specifications, hindering any sensible interpretation of these coefficients at all. Taken together, these findings imply that neither stage of Operation Bayonet meaningfully affected vendors' returns on reputation.

The insignificance of the Hansa $\times$ *thumbsup* term is predicted by H4. We now see that the Hansa takedown significantly increased vendors' returns on reputation on Dream, an open market, but not on Valhalla, an invite-only market. I find it reasonable to conclude that impersonation is indeed the key element of the Hansa takedown that caused buyers' trust in vendors to fall.

As an aside, I suspect that the other interaction term, Alphabay $\times$ *thumbsup*, is insignificant because of Valhalla's invite-only policy. Recall that on the Dream market, the share of new vendors increased from 2.6% in t_1 to 15.6% in t_2 (Table 1). But because invitation links to Valhalla are harder to come by, Valhalla saw no such spike: 1.4% of vendors were new in t_1 , and 3.7% were new in t_2 (Appendix, Table 13). This supports our earlier conjecture about how the Alphabay takedown decreased returns on reputation on the Dream market.

	Log revenue per transaction		Log market share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
thumbsup	-0.0168 (-0.89)	-0.0181 (-0.98)	-0.000369 (-0.02)	-0.00463 (-0.20)
Alphabay $\times$ thumbsup	0.0117 (0.45)	0.0210 (0.76)	-0.0372 (-1.06)	-0.0101 (-0.27)
Hansa $\times$ thumbsup	0.00745 (0.53)	-0.000582 (-0.03)	0.0383 (1.54)	0.0178 (0.72)
Alphabay	-0.212 (-1.31)	-0.239 (-1.34)	-1.771*** (-7.91)	-1.836*** (-7.92)
Hansa	-0.00135 (-0.01)	0.0346 (0.25)	-0.736** (-3.30)	-0.632** (-2.86)
Adjusted R^2	0.111	0.132	0.711	0.739
Additional dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	314	314	314	314

t statistics in parentheses. Additional controls are *txnsuntil* and *diversity*.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7: Fixed effect estimates, Valhalla market, 14-day lag in international shipments.

5 Conclusion

As we have seen, our empirical analyses provide support for H1 through H4: impersonation campaigns by law enforcement decrease buyers’ trust, which manifests as an increase in vendor returns on reputation. This raises the barrier to entry for prospective new vendors, who must start with a blank slate. This paper is the first to supply quantitative evidence for what has long been theorized about illicit markets: that when trust declines, buyers “concentrate their transactions with fewer but trusted dealers” (Decary-Hetu & Giommoni, 2016, p.18). Whereas most previous studies about reputation assumed that its effects stay the same over time, I demonstrate how returns on reputation can change predictably in response to exogenous events.

As of late, law enforcement agencies have shifted focus away from arresting darknet administrators, to arresting darknet vendors. Notably, 61 darknet vendors who trafficked primarily in opioids, including fentanyl, were arrested in 2019 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019). Concentrating sales in the hands of fewer vendors makes such operations easier. Not only are there fewer vendors *at all*, each vendor also becomes more conspicuous. For instance, law enforcement caught @sinmed, one of the top vendors on Dream after Operation Bayonet, be-

cause of his suspicious and increasingly large ATM withdrawals (Barrett, 2019).

Properly investigating the long-run effects of Operation Bayonet requires longitudinal data on more recent markets – data that do not yet exist, and are technologically challenging to collect. However, evidence suggests that Bayonet was successful in erecting persistent barriers to entry. In the four months before Bayonet, the number of Dream vendors increased from around 1,000 to a peak of 1,700. Over the next year, Dream became the predominant darknet market and its sales volumes more than doubled – but the number of vendors did not increase.¹⁴ Furthermore, when law enforcement agencies raided Wall Street Market – the largest surviving market in 2019 after the closure of Dream – it only had one-seventh as many vendors as Alphabay did in its prime (Popper, 2019).

As anti-vendor operations continue, future works could attempt to replicate my findings about returns on reputation on newer markets. Darknet markets also raise larger concerns of social welfare: do they reduce social costs by making drug trafficking safer, or increase social harm by providing easy access to drugs? Might government funds be better spent on drug education and demand reduction campaigns rather than expensive law enforcement operations? Future research could start chipping away at these questions.

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¹⁴I would have liked to track growth rates of Dream’s vendor population, but incomplete data coverage between October 2017 and April 2018 prevents accurate computations.

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7 Appendix

Transcript of Alphasay seizure notice from Figure 2:

“This hidden site has been seized since July 4, 2017, as a part of a law enforcement operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and European law enforcement agencies acting through Europol, in accordance with the law of European Union member states and obtained pursuant to a forfeiture order by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of California and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section.”

Transcript of Hansa seizure notice from Figure 3:

“This hidden site has been seized *and controlled since June 20* [emphasis theirs] by the Dutch National Police in conjunction with the Bundeskriminalamt, Lietuvos Policija, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Europol, under the authority of the Dutch National Prosecutor’s Office and the Attorney General’s office of the Federal State of Hesse (Germany).

“The Dutch National Police have located Hansa Market and taken over control of this marketplace since June 20, 2017. We have modified the source code, which allowed us to capture passwords, PGP-encrypted order information, IP-addresses, Bitcoins and other relevant information that may help law enforcement agencies worldwide to identify users of this marketplace. For more information about this operation, please consult our hidden service at politiepcvh42eav.onion.

“This seizure was part of Operation Bayonet, which includes the takeover of Hansa Market by the National Police of the Netherlands and the takedown of Alphasay Market by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States of America on July 4, 2017.”



Figure 8: Notice of seizure from Silk Road takedown, 2013. *Image from Wikipedia.*



Figure 9: Notice of seizure from Operation Onymous, 2014. *Image from TechCrunch.*

Table 8: Historical mean star rating as main regressor. 14-day lag in international shipments.

	Log revenue per transaction		Log market share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
meanuntil	0.0242 (0.47)	0.0268 (0.54)	0.0383 (0.50)	0.0417 (0.58)
Alphabay $\times$ meanuntil	-0.213** (-3.09)	-0.175** (-2.63)	-0.452*** (-4.20)	-0.357*** (-3.53)
Hansa $\times$ meanuntil	0.190 (1.14)	0.150 (0.92)	0.280 (1.04)	0.202 (0.82)
Alphabay	1.156*** (3.45)	0.968** (2.97)	1.476** (2.81)	1.019* (2.07)
Hansa	-0.949 (-1.16)	-0.726 (-0.91)	-0.983 (-0.75)	-0.504 (-0.42)
Transaction count	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.168	0.215	0.255	0.347

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9: 16-day lag in international shipments, all controls included.

	Log revenue per transaction		Log market share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
meanrating	-0.0410 (-0.48)		-0.0242 (-0.21)	
Alphabay $\times$ meanrating	-0.0510 (-0.50)		-0.113 (-0.76)	
Hansa $\times$ meanrating	0.296* (2.29)		0.521** (2.91)	
fivestars		0.000349 (0.33)		0.00294 (1.29)
Alphabay $\times$ fivestars		-0.00279* (-2.51)		-0.00804*** (-3.51)
Hansa $\times$ fivestars		0.00234** (3.06)		0.00644*** (4.06)
Alphabay	0.339 (0.67)	0.184*** (5.42)	-0.0879 (-0.12)	-0.370*** (-6.71)
Hansa	-1.438* (-2.28)	-0.0910** (-2.96)	-2.080* (-2.38)	0.189*** (3.79)
Adjusted R^2	0.206	0.224	0.346	0.392
Observations	4699	4699	4699	4699

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 10: 18-day lag in international shipments, all controls included.

	Log revenue per transaction		Log market share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
meanrating	-0.0281 (-0.32)		-0.0280 (-0.23)	
Alphabay $\times$ meanrating	-0.0691 (-0.65)		-0.0862 (-0.56)	
Hansa $\times$ meanrating	0.254* (2.17)		0.465** (2.74)	
fivestars		0.00137 (1.13)		0.00481 (1.70)
Alphabay $\times$ fivestars		-0.00291** (-2.68)		-0.00818*** (-3.67)
Hansa $\times$ fivestars		0.00146 (1.61)		0.00439* (2.14)
Alphabay	0.416 (0.80)	0.164*** (4.77)	-0.187 (-0.25)	-0.363*** (-6.19)
Hansa	-1.234* (-2.16)	-0.0740* (-2.42)	-1.870* (-2.26)	0.170*** (3.42)
Adjusted R^2	0.198	0.210	0.351	0.385
Observations	4686	4686	4686	4686

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11: 20-day lag in international shipments, all controls included.

	Log revenue per transaction		Log market share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
meanrating	-0.0141 (-0.16)		-0.0379 (-0.30)	
Alphabay $\times$ meanrating	-0.0516 (-0.48)		-0.0491 (-0.31)	
Hansa $\times$ meanrating	0.130 (1.05)		0.341 (1.89)	
fivestars		0.00164 (1.41)		0.00546* (2.00)
Alphabay $\times$ fivestars		-0.00322** (-3.01)		-0.00885*** (-3.95)
Hansa $\times$ fivestars		0.00151 (1.81)		0.00439* (2.31)
Alphabay	0.331 (0.62)	0.169*** (4.89)	-0.367 (-0.48)	-0.355*** (-6.06)
Hansa	-0.635 (-1.06)	-0.0851** (-2.82)	-1.262 (-1.44)	0.165*** (3.41)
Adjusted R^2	0.195	0.211	0.350	0.389
Observations	4665	4665	4665	4665

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 12: Interaction terms of reputation (*fivestars*) with *severe*.

	(1) <i>meanrevenue</i>	(2) <i>mktshare</i>
Alphabay $\times$ fivestars	-0.00269* (-2.45)	-0.00790*** (-3.37)
Hansa $\times$ fivestars	0.00259*** (3.34)	0.00729*** (4.65)
severe $\times$ fivestars	-0.00108 (-0.52)	-0.00435 (-0.91)
severe $\times$ Alphabay $\times$ fivestars	-0.000322 (-0.27)	0.00124 (0.46)
severe $\times$ Hansa $\times$ fivestars	0.00143 (1.56)	0.00358 (1.84)
Adjusted R^2	0.232	0.395

t statistics in parentheses. All controls included. 14-day lag in international shipments.

** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Summary statistics of Valhalla vendor-level variables, by time period.

	t_1		t_2		t_3	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
meanrevenue	146.96	319.30	191.65	201.30	288.54	746.79
mktshare (%)	1.282	2.999	0.752	1.329	0.781	2.229
thumbsup	4.70	4.38	5.76	5.23	11.56	12.07
txns	4.00	3.66	10.32	10.37	7.63	10.00
txnsuntil	16.82	8.96	16.75	11.63	27.77	18.29
diversity	0.188	0.258	0.209	0.259	0.203	0.251
new vendors	1		5		1	
total vendors	73		133		128	